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BALDWIN V. STATE
It is unfortunate that in light of the confused state of Maryland
case law and the comprehensive scope of the modem Maryland Corpo-
ration Act, around which new case law could be built, the doctrine of
estoppel was used to decide Cranson. With an obvious trend pointing
in the direction of the Model Act and Robertson v. Levy, this would
have been an ideal opportunity for a Maryland judicial pronouncement
in this direction. It is most probable that in drafting the Maryland
statute, the drafters were aware of the unpredictable and confusing
law surrounding the problem of defective corporations and desired a
result similar to that reached by the Model Act 8 and the Robertson
case. Unfortunately, it appears that section 131 of the Maryland
Corporation Act still lacks the strength of a literal interpretation, and
the same problem which has weakened prior statutes and has led to
wide-spread use of the de facto and estoppel doctrines will continue
to dominate this area of corporation law in Maryland.
Wife's Right To Recovery For Loss Of Consortium
Due To The Negligent Injury Of Her Husband
Baldwin v. State1
Plaintiff's husband sustained injuries when the truck he was
operating was struck by the defendant's railway locomotive. Plaintiff
and her husband brought suit alleging that the defendant was negligent
in the operation of the locomotive. The husband sought to recover for
personal injuries sustained, while the plaintiff-wife sought to recover
for the loss of the consortium of her husband. Upon motion of the
defendants, the trial court dismissed the complaint of the plaintiff-wife.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Vermont affirmed the lower court
and held that the plaintiff-wife had no right to recover for loss of
consortium due to the negligent injury of her husband.2
Consortium is the "conjugal fellowship of husband and wife, and
the right of each to the company, co-operation, affection, and aid of the
other in every conjugal relation."3 Although this definition implies
that this right is reciprocal between the spouses, the law has failed to
accord husband and wife equal treatment where there has been a loss
of consortium caused by a defendant's negligence. While a husband is
allowed to sue for loss of consortium due to the negligent injury of
his wife,4 the majority of the courts deny the wife the same cause of
action when her husband has been negligently injured.5
38. See note 30 supra.
1. 215 A.2d 492 (Vt. 1965).
2. Id. at 494.
3. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
4. See 27 AM. JuR. Husband and Wife §§ 501-02 (1940) ; 41 C.J.S. Husband and
Wife § 401 (1944).
5. See 27 Am. JuR. Husband and Wife §§ 513-14 (1940) 41 C.J.S. Husband and
Wife § 404 (1944).
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Without reviewing any of the historical development of the law,'
the Baldwin court recognized that "There is no dispute that at common
law a married woman had no right of action to sue for the loss of
consortium of her husband."' While a majority of the courts have
accepted this interpretation of the common law,8 it has not been un-
disputed.' Some courts which hold that the wife has no right of action
base -their conclusions on the fact that at common law, husband and
wife were one, and "he was the one."1  All that belonged to the wife
prior to the marriage became the husband's upon marriage.1 In addi-
tion to not being able to enter into a con-tract, 2 the wife's services,
like those of any -servant, became the property of the husband, the
loss of which he could recover from those responsible.'" In effect, the
wife assumed the "degraded position . . . [of] a combination vessel,
chattel, and household drudge .... ,,14 Consequently, the wife was not
permitted to recover for the loss of her husband's services, the ex-
planation being "that the inferior [has] no kind of property in the
company, care or assistance of the superior, as the superior is held to
have in those of the inferior, and therefore the inferior can suffer no
loss or injury. '15 Despite the fact that consortium "includes, in addi-
tion to material services, elements of companionship, felicity and
sexual intercourse, all welded into a conceptualistic unity,""' these
cases proceed on the theory that material services, not "sentimental
injuries," are the predominant factor for which compensation is given.
Thus, having found that the common law allowed the wife no property
right in her husband's services, they conclude that the wife has no
right of action for loss of consortium at common law.' 7
6. For a good discussion of the history of consortium, see Lippmann, The Break-
down of Consortium, 30 COLUM. L. Rv. 651 (1930).
7. 215 A.2d at 493.
8. E.g., Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1952) ; Potter v. Schafter, 161 Me.
340, 211 A.2d 891 (1965) ; Coastal Tank Lines, Inc. v. Canoles, 207 Md. 37, 113 A.2d 82(1955) ; Nelson v. A. M. Lockett & Co., 206 Okla. 334, 243 P.2d 719 (1952) ; Page
v. Winter, 240 S.C. 516, 126 S.E.2d 570 (1962); Ash v. S. S. Mullen, Inc., 43 Wash.
2d 345, 261 P.2d 118 (1953); Seagraves v. Legg, 127 S.E.2d 605 (W.Va. 1962);
Nickel v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 269 Wis. 647, 70 N.W.2d 205 (1955) ; see
also RESTATSMNT, TORTS § 695 (1938).
9. See, e.g., Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 816 (D.C. Cir. 1950), 23
A.L.R.2d 1366 (1958).
10. Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 78 N.W.2d 480, 484 (1956).
11. 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES §§ 433-36 (Lewis ed. 1898).
12. 1 BiSrioP, MARRMD WOMEN § 39 (1873).
13. Hyde v. Scyssor, Cro. Jac. 538, 79 Eng. Rep. 462; Guy v. Livesey, Cro. Jac.
501, 79 Eng. Rep. 438; 8 HOLSWORTH, A HIsToiw or ' ENGLISH LAW 429, 430 (2d
ed. 1937).
14. Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227, 230 (1960).
15. 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES § 143 (Lewis ed. 1898).
16. Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881, 891, 86 A.L.R.2d 1184 (1960).
17. See Boden v. Del-Mar Garage, 205 Ind. 59, 185 N.E. 860 (1933) ; Brown v.
Kistleman, 177 Ind. 692, 98 N.E. 631 (1912) ; Stout v. Kansas City Term. Ry. Co.,
172 Mo. App. 113, 157 S.W. 1019 (1913). But see Novak v. Kansas City Transit, Inc.,
365 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. 1963), aff'd, Shepard v. Consumers Cooperative Ass'n, 384
S.W.2d 635 (Mo. 1964), where the court said that loss of services was only one of




In addition to acknowledging the common law doctrines, the
Baldwin court also dismissed the plaintiff-wife's action because she
failed to allege "a breach of duty owing to her alone."' 8 The defendant's
duty to use reasonable care was only owing to the plaintiff's husband,
and "a right to a recovery in negligence does not accrue to a plaintiff
derivatively.' 9 Some courts have denied a wife recovery for loss of
consortium on the ground that injury to the wife is too indirect and,
therefore, not compensable in negligence."0 This rationale has been
rejected by other courts for two reasons: first, this statement of
causation may not be the general rule in the particular jurisdiction;
second, the same rule, if valid, would deny the husband a similar
action and, thereby, conflict with the common law.2 ' The Vermont
court, which permits a husband ,to recover in a similar action, justified
its inconsistent position and refusal to grant the wife an equivalent
recovery in the instant case on the grounds that survival of the
husband's cause of action since the enactment of the Married Women's
Act (Married Women's Property Act) has been by "acquiescence and
not because it has withstood critical analysis. '22  Quoting Justice
Schaefer's dissent in Dini v. Naiditch,23 the Baldwin court refused to
grant the wife a cause of action merely to 'be consistent with an
"outworn common-law cause of action." While those who favor judi-
cial restraint may commend the Vermont court's reluctance to grant
the wife a cause of action, the inconsistency still exists. Some courts
have resolved the problem by also denying the husband a cause of
action.24
Until 1950, all of the American courts which had been confronted
with this question, except for two which were subsequently reversed,25
held that a wife has no cause of action for loss of consortium resulting
from a negligent injury to her husband.26 In that year the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Hitaffer v. Argonne
Co. 2 ' rendered a lengthy opinion which reviewed and analyzed all the
case law on this question and held that despite "the unanimity of
authority elsewhere denying the wife recovery,"'28 "a wife has a cause
of action for loss of consortium due to a negligent injury to her
18. 215 A.2d at 493.
19. Ibid.
20. See, e.g., Coastal Tank Lines v. Canoles, 207 Md. 37, 113 A.2d at 87 (1955);
Feneff v. New York Central & Hudson R.R. Co., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N.E. 436 (1909);
Howard v. Verdigris Valley Elect. Co-op., 201 Okla. 504, 207 P.2d 784 (1949).
21. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1950) ; Acuff v. Schmit,
248 Iowa 272, 78 N.W.2d 480, 485 (1956).
22. 215 A.2d at 494.
23. 20 Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881, 893, 86 A.L.R.2d 1184 (1960).
24. See, e.g., Lockwood v. Wilson M. Lee Company, 144 Conn. 155, 128 A.2d 330
(1956) ; Rodgers v. Boynton, 315 Mass. 279, 52 N.E.2d 576 (1943) ; Helmstetler v.
Duke Power Co., 224 N.C. 821, 32 S.E.2d 611 (1945); Martin v. United Electric
Rys. Co., 71 R.I. 137, 42 A.2d 897 (1945).
25. Hipp v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 182 N.C. 9, 108 S.E. 318 (1921),
overr'd, Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925) ; Griffen
v. Cincinnati Realty Co., 27 Ohio 585 (Super. Ct. 1913), overr'd, Smith v. Nicholas
Bldg. Co., 93 Ohio St. 101, 112 N.E. 204 (1915).
26. See generally Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 1378 (1952).
27. 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950), overr'd on other grounds, Smither & Co. v.
Coles, 242 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 914 (1957).
28. Id. at 812.
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husband." 9 Since Hitaffer, the courts have not been unanimous in
denying a wife a cause of action. Two federal courts3" and eight
states3' have adopted the Hitaffer result. On the other hand, twenty-
three jurisdictions have continued to deny recovery to a wife. 2 How-
ever, many of the courts which reject the Hitaffer result admit the
inadequacy of the common law rule but leave any necessary change to
their legislatures.
33
Proponents of the common law rule defend their position on
various grounds. They state that at common law the wife had no
right to the services of her husband, irrespective of her incapacity to
sue; therefore, the passing of the Married Women's Act did not create
a new right in the wife, but merely removed certain common law
disabilities.' In effect, she still cannot sue for loss of consortium. They
argue that granting the wife a right of action will result in "double-
recovery." The husband, when negligently injured, may sue for all the
injuries he has sustained, including his inability to provide for and
associate with his wife. Allowing the wife -to sue will permit her to
"recover from the same wrongdoer the damages she has sustained for
the same injuries which her husband may recover for and out of
which recovery he is presumed to support and care for her." 5 They
point out that the wife's injuries, which they label "sentimental," are
too remote and consequential to be capable of measure, as opposed to
the husband's injuries (loss of services), which are material and
measurable. 6 They stress the point that to recognize a wife's right to
recovery at this late date would be a usurpation of the legislative
29. Id. at 819.
30. See Luther v. Maple, 250 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1958) (applying Nebraska law);
Duffy v. Lipsman-Fulkerson & Co., 200 F. Supp. 71 (D. Mont. 1961).
31. Missouri Pacific Transportation Co. v. Miller, 227 Ark. 251, 299 S.W.2d 41
(1957) ; Stenta v. Leblang, 185 A.2d 759 (Del. 1962) ; Brown v. Georgia-Tennessee
Coaches, Inc., 88 Ga. App. 519, 77 S.E.2d 24 (1st Div. 1953), and Bailey v. Wilson,
100 Ga. App. 405, 111 S.E.2d 106 (2d Div. 1959), both affirmed in Walden v. Coleman,
105 Ga. App. 242, 124 S.E.2d 313 (1962) ; Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d
881 (1960); Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 78 N.W.2d 480 (1956); Montgomery v.
Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227 (1960) ; Novak v. Kansas City Transit, Inc.,
365 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. 1963) ; Hoekstra v. Helgeland, 78 S.D. 82, 98 N.W.2d 669 (1959).
32. Nineteen of these jurisdictions are cited in Igneri v. Cie. de Transports
Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257, 261 n.9 (2d Cir. 1963). The other four jurisdictions are
Potter v. Schafter, 161 Me. 340, 211 A.2d 891 (1965) ; State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Village of Isle, 122 N.W.2d 236 (Minn. 1963) ; Roseberry v. Starkovich, 73
N.M. 211, 387 P.2d 321 (1963); Rush v. Great American Insurance Company, 213
Tenn. 506, 376 S.W.2d 454 (1964).
33. See, e.g., Smith v. United Construction Workers, Dist. 50, 271 Ala. 42, 122
So. 2d 153 (1960) ; Deshotel v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., 50 Cal. 2d
664, 328 P.2d 449, 452 (1958) ; Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1952) ; Hoffman
v. Dautel, 192 Kan. 406 388 P.2d 615 (1964) ; Garrett v. Reno Oil Co., 271 S.W.2d
764 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) ; Ash v. S. S. Mullen, Inc., 43 Wash. 2d 345, 261 P.2d 118
(1953) ; Seagraves v. Legg, 127 S.E.2d 605 (W.Va. 1962).
34. See, e.g., Rush v. Great American Insurance Company, 213 Tenn. 506, 376
S.W.2d 454 (1964); Ash v. S. S. Mullen, Inc., 43 Wash. 2d 345, 261 P.2d 118 (1953);
Nickel v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 269 Wis. 647, 70 N.W.2d 205, 208 (1955).
35. Nickel v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 269 Wis. 647, 70 N.W.2d 205, 208
(1955). See also Deshotel v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., 50 Cal. 2d
664, 328 P.2d 449, 451 (1958) ; Kronenbitter v. Washburn Wire Company, 4 N.Y.2d
524, 151 N.E.2d 898 (1958).
36. See, e.g., Feneff v. New York Central & Hudson R.R. Co., 203 Mass. 278,
89 N.E. 436 (1909) ; Gambino v. Mfgrs. Coal & Coke Co., 175 Mo. App. 653, 158




function. 7  Lastly, they argue that to permit the wife a right of
recovery will broaden a defendant's scope of duty and liability to per-
sons to whom his actions were not directed.8  Not only will the
defendant now be liable to the wife for damages, but the "door may
be opened" to children and other members of the family. 9
The jurisdictions which permit the wife a cause of action remain
unconvinced that the common law rule should be followed and criticize
the "specious and fallacious reasoning"40 employed 'by those courts
which uphold it. They reject the contention that the wife has no right
of consortium since the passing of the Married Women's Act, be-
cause this contention is based on the premise that loss of services
is the predominant factor in an action for loss of consortium.4 ' Con-
sortium, while including material services, "also includes love, affection,
companionship, sexual relations, etc., all welded into a conceptualistic
unity."' The argument then advanced is that the wife had no cause
of action at common law only because she lacked a capacity to sue,
and with the passing of the Married Women's Acts, she now has the
capacity to sue.43 One court even urges that the Married Women's
Acts have placed husband and wife on an equal plane so that "it is
immaterial to her action today whether her cause of action existed at
the early common law or not."4 Consistently maintaining that con-
sortium constitutes more than material services,45 the "double-recovery"
argument is discarded as "merely a convenient clich6 for denying the
wife's action for loss of consortium."46 That material services are an
element of consortium is not denied, but the "simple mathematics" of
deducting from the wife's damages any compensation given to the
husband in his action for the impairment of his ability to support will
prevent double-recovery.47
The contention that the wife's injuries, which courts label
"sentimental" since they do not include loss of material services, are
too remote and consequential to be capable of measure is regarded as
unsupportable when one recognizes that the husband is allowed a
recovery for the same type of injuries. The husband's recovery in his
action for loss of consortium includes "sentimental injuries" as well
as material services. Were the contention correct, "in both cases the
damages for the sentimental elements would be too remote and con-
37. See cases cited note 3 supra; but cf. note 61 infra and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Giggley v. Gallagher Transportation Co., 101 Colo. 258, 72 P.2d
1100 (1937) ; Emerson v. Taylor, 133 Md. 192, 104 Atl. 538 (1918) ; Hinnant v. Tide-
water Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925).
39. See, e.g., Coastal Tank Lines v. Canoles, 207 Md. 37, 113 A.2d 82 (1955).
40. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
41. See, e.g., Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1950) ; Mont-
gomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227, 231-32 (1960) ; see also Lippman,
The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 COLUa. L. Rev. 651, 668 (1930).
42. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
43. See, e.g., Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 78 N.W.2d 480, 484 (1956).
44. Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227, 233 (1960).
45. See note 41 supra.
46. Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881, 891 (1960).
47. See, e.g., Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1950) ; Dini
v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881, 891 (1960) ; Montgomery v. Stephan, 359
Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227, 231 (1960).
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sequential; and yet we do not apply such a rule in the husband's
action."4
Most of these arguments for and against the wife's right to re-
covery for loss of consortium have been propounded ad infinitum.
Recently, however, a new argument based on the Constitution of the
United States has been presented by the courts to support the position
for allowing the wife the right to recover. In Clem v. Brown,"9 Judge
Hitchcock's bitter and sarcastic opinion held that the common law rule,
which denies a wife a cause of action for loss of consortium but allows
her husband the same cause of action, is a violation of the equal pro-
tection clause5" of the Constitution. The rationale of Judge Hitchcock
was as follows: equal protection of the laws requires that all persons
similarly situated 'be treated alike, although differences in treatment
are permissible where there is a basis for those differences reasonably
related to the purpose which state laws, rules and regulations seek to
accomplish. The underlying premise upon which the common law
rule existed, a husband's superiority or proprietary interest in his wife,
no longer exists. To continue to disallow the wife's cause of action
would be to violate the Constitution.5' Although the -tone of Judge
Hitchcock's opinion reflected his dissatisfaction with the Supreme
Court's recent interpretations of the fourteenth amendment concerning
federal-state authority, the legal implications of Clem v. Brown are
far reaching. While not applicable in those states which have also
denied the husband's right to sue, the equal protection clause may be
the catalyst which eventually compels acceptance of the Hitaffer result
in a majority of states.
The Maryland Court of Appeals is in direct accord with the
Baldwin court in the principal case. In Coastal Tank Lines v. Canoles,5"
the court rejected the Hitaffer 'holding and affirmed an earlier Mary-
land decision, Emerson v. Taylor,58 denying the wife a cause of action
for loss of her husband's consortium due to the defendant's negligence.
The rationale of the court is quite susceptible to attack by those who
advocate allowing the wife her cause of action. The court mentioned
that Hitaffer had not been followed by any court of last resort.54 This
is no longer true5 5 and, as recently recognized by the court in Nicholson
v. Blanchette,56 "while this statement was true when written, Prosser
tells us that 'around 1958 something of a current of support for the
Hitaffer case set in, and since that date the trend has been definitely in
the direction of approval.' ,,57
48. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
49. 207 N.E.2d 398 (Ct. Comm. P1. Ohio 1965).
50. "No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
51. But see Seagraves v. Legg, 127 S.E.2d 605 (W.Va. 1962), where the court
said there was no violation of the equal protection clause since the constitution of
West Virginia preserves the common law and the wife has no cause of action for such
loss of consortium at common law.
52. 207 Md. 37, 113 A.2d 82 (1955), cited with approval, Nicholson v. Blanchette,
239 Md. 168, 210 A.2d 732 (1965).
53. 133 Md. 192, 104 Att. 538 (1918).
54. Coastal Tank Lines v. Canoles, 207 Md. 37, 47, 113 A.2d 82, 87 (1955).
55. See notes 20 and 31 supra and accompanying text.
56. 239 Md. 168, 210 A.2d 732 (1965).
57. Id. at 186 n.5, 210 A.2d at 742 n.5.
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The Canoles court felt that the earlier Maryland decision, even
"if not correctly decided on principle, is supported by the overwhelming
weight of authority, ancient and modern. ' 58 Bound by Emerson and
impressed by the scarcity of divergent authority, the court refused to
give much weight to "arguments based on abstract theory and logical
symmetry." 9 Today, however, the authorities are in fact significantly
divided, such that "arguments based on abstract theory and logical
symmetry" -should be given a higher degree of consideration.
The Canoles court's reluctance to give any weight to the logical
arguments was undoubtedly caused by its adherence to the doctrine of
stare decisis. While few question the importance of stare decisis, it
seems equally important to prevent today's law from being decided
upon bygone principles."0 The female today is no longer in the "de-
graded position . . . [of] a combination vessel, chattel, and household
drudge.. . ."" Her common law disabilities have long been abolished.
She is, in effect, equal before the eyes of the law, and she should be
given equal treatment. To have reversed earlier decisions and al-
lowed the wife a cause of action in Canoles would not have been a new
legal technique for the court. As the Court of Appeals has stated on
prior occasions, "when the reason behind a rule ceases to exist, the rule
itself will no longer apply."8
The Canoles court relied 'heavily on the case of Best v. Samuel
Fox, Ld.,3 an English decision, which, in denying the wife a cause of
action, employed the reasoning that a negligent defendant's duty does
not extend to remote consequences affecting third parties. Maryland's
negligence law supports the same results concerning a defendant's
liability to remote third persons.6 4 But the court failed to satisfactorily
deal with the inconsistency of not limiting the defendant's liability
where the wife is the negligently injured party and the husband is
suing.65 Instead, the Maryland court quotes Lord Porter's comment
in Best that "the common law is a historical development rather
than a logical whole, and the fact that a particular doctrine does not
logically accord with another or others is no ground for its rejection.""6
Actually, however, Lord Porter's broad statement could have been just
as easily used to justify allowing the wife a cause of action in spite of
58. 207 Md. 37, 49, 113 A2d 82, 88 (1955).
59. Ibid.
60. "Social, political, and legal reforms had changed the relations between the
sexes, and put woman and man upon a plane of equality. Decisions founded upon the
assumption of bygone inequality were unrelated to present-day realities and ought not
to be permitted to prescribe a rule of life." CARDOZo, TH GROWTH Or THs LAW
105-06 (1924).
61. See note 14 supra.
62. See, e.g., State v. Cohen, 166 Md. 682, 687-88, 172 At. 274, 277 (1934)
Barker v. Ayers, 5 Md. 202, 209 (1853).
63. [1952] A.C. 716, affirming [1951] 2 K.B. 639.
64. See, e.g., Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952); State v.
Baltimore Transit Co., 197 Md. 528, 80 A.2d 13 (1951).
65. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
66. Best v. Samuel Fox, Ld., [1952] A.C. 716, affirming [1951] 2 K.B. 639.
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the Maryland negligence rule."' For example, the Georgia courts"8
agree with the Maryland negligence rule 'but also allow the wife a cause
of action for loss of consortium due to the negligent injury of her
husband. 9
Authors of treatises and articles, as well as the courts, are in
disagreement as to whether the wife's cause of action for loss of con-
sortium due to the negligent injury of her husband should be allowed,
but the majority support allowing the wife the action.70 While the argu-
ments advanced are impressive for both sides, the better result is to
allow the wife to recover. Those who agree with Hitaffer, but await
legislative action, 71 must remember that it is within the tradition of the
courts to create additional legal remedies without waiting for the
legislature.72
But in Maryland the possibility of judicial change on this issue has
been made difficult. In order to change the law today the Court of
Appeals would not only have to overrule the 1918 case of Emerson v.
Taylor,73 but also the 1955 Canoles decision. While one might well
argue that due to significant changes in the social status of women
since 1918 stare decisis need no longer be heeded regarding the
Emerson case, the change since 1955 has certainly not been substantial
enough to warrant a complete reversal in policy. To overrule Canoles
now would threaten the vitality of stare decisis in Maryland. 74 Perhaps,
therefore, relief at this point should only come from the legislature.
The reason supporting the wife's right of recovery should be as per-
suasive to the legislature as they have been to some courts. Conse-
quently, it is suggested to the Maryland legislature that it change the
law and make "what is sauce for the gander ... sauce for the goose."75
However, if the argument that the common law rule constitutes a
denial of equal protection is valid, the Canoles decision must be re-
versed, notwithstanding the principle of stare decisis.7"
67. Establishment of a defendant's duty to a wife can easily be accomplished:
There is a duty if the court says there is a duty; the law, like the Constitu-
tion, is what we make it. Duty is only a word with which we state our conclusion
that there is or is not to be liability; it necessarily begs the essential question.
When we find a duty, breach and damage, everything has been said. The word
serves a useful purpose in directing attention to the obligation to be imposed
upon the defendant, rather than the causal sequence of events; beyond that it
serves none. In the decision whether or not there is a duty, many factors inter-
play: the hand of history, our ideas as to where the loss should fall. In the end
the court will decide whether there is a duty on the basis of the mores of the
community, "always keeping in mind the fact that we endeavor to make a rule
in each case that will be practical and in keeping with the general understanding
of mankind."
Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MIcH. L. Rzv. 1, 15 (1953).
68. See Blanchard v. Reliable Transfer Co., 71 Ga. App. 843, 32 S.E2d 420 (1944).
69. See Georgia cases cited note 31 supra.
70. See Igneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257, 261, 262 n.11, 12
(1963), where the commentator vote is listed.
71. See note 33 supra.
72. See Simeone, The Wife's Action for Loss of Consortium - Progress or No?,
4 ST. Louis U.L.J. 424, 439 (1957), which discusses how the courts have created
additional legal remedies for wrongs such as pre-natal injuries, etc.
73. 133 Md. 192, 104 Atl. 538 (1918).
74. But see Nesbit v. Riesenman, 298 Pa. 475, 483, 148 Atl. 695, 697 (1930), cited
in McKay, Is a Wife Entitled to Damages for Loss of Consortium?, 64 DIcK. L. Rxv.
57, 63 (1959).
75. Hayes v. Swenson, 108 P.L.J. 141 (C.P. Allegheny County, Pa. 1958).
76. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
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